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THE UNIFORM ConE OF MILITARY JusTICE-NEw fuGHTS AND A
MEANs To ENFORCE THEM-The Uniform Code of Military Justice,
designed to govern the entire military establishment of the United
States, was enacted May 5, 1950, replacing the three separate systems
of law theretofore applied to the Army, Navy, and Air Force.1 Pressure
for a uniform code was a reflection of the great surge toward unification
of the Armed Services which followed World War II. The new Code,
however, is not just a revision and consolidation of the prior systems of
military law. World War II, with its great increase in the size of the
Armed Services and in the percentage of the population under the jurisdiction of military law, exposed many of the inadequacies of the old
system to heavy public criticism. Consequently the new Code represents not only unificatiop. but also substantial reform in the system
of military law.
The strongest and most recurring attacks upon the military law
have been leveled at its failure to provide military personnel with the
benefit of adequate protection for the right to a fair trial, a right which
in civilian courts is accorded the highest possible protection. The new
Code has by no means escaped such criticism,2 for there are serious defects in the military law which remain substantially unchanged by its
provisions. This is not surprising, for military law is regarded by the
Armed Services primarily as an instrument of discipline and only secondarily as a system of justice.3 It has always been recognized that the
necessity for discipline in the Armed Services requires a system essentially more arbitrary than may constitutionally be imposed upon civilians. Prior to the last decade, public pressure for reform in military law
was virtually non-existent, for except in time of war the Armed Services
were limited to a very small group of professionals. It has become apparent in the past few years that in spite of the traditional antipathy in this
country toward a large standing army, a relatively large and essentially
civilian standing army will have to be maintained. In war or peace, it
seems clear that a much larger proportion of our population may anticipate becoming subject to the jurisdiction of the military law for some
period in their lives. Accordingly, the need has. become more pressing
1

64 Stat. L. 108 (1950), 50 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §§551-736, effective May 31,

1951.
2 Principally by Arthur J. Keefe, Professor of Law, Cornell University, who aided in
the preparation of the new Code. See Keefe and Moskin, "Codified Military Injustice," 35
CoRN. L.Q. 151 (1950). For other general discussions of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, see Snedeker, 38 GEo. L.J. 521 (1950); Re, 25 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 155 (1951);
Butts, 21 MISS. L.J. 203 (1951); 2 WEST. REs. L. REv. 147 (1950); 29 T:sx:. L. REv. 651
(1951).
a Snedeker, "The Uniform Code of Military Justice," 38 GEo. L.J. 521 at 521 (1950).
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for a system of military law which provides, in addition to discipline,
adequate machinery to effectuate justice. It is not the purpose of this
comment to discuss at any length reforms in the system of justice which
have been proposed, but only to discuss to what extent changes effected
by the new Code have cured the more important defects in the military
law as a system of justice. The majority of failures in military justice
in the past have stemmed primarily from these defects: command control over courts-martial, an insufficient number of legally trained personnel, and inadequate means for securing appellate review.

I. Command Control
Command control is a term applied to the extensive power over
military disciplinary and judicial machinery which is vested in officers
with command responsibility. Since discipline, a commander's responsibility, is a fundamental necessity to an effective military force, command control over the means of enforcing it and thereby carrying out
that responsibility is deemed imperative.
The Code requires the commander to appoint the members of the
court,4 the law officer,° and counsel,6 all of whom are members of his
command and responsible to him. The commander also has the power
to disapprove :findings and sentence and order a re-hearing,7 and to
remit or suspend sentence.8 Thus the means to exert a strong influence
over the whole proceedings are in his hands. Recognizing the problem,
Congress provided in the Code that he shall not censure, reprimand, or
admonish those performing judicial functions, and that neither he nor
anyone else subject to the Code shall attempt to coerce or, by any other
unauthorized means, influence judicial action. 9 An intentional violation
of this provision is made a punishable offense by the Code.10 As a practical matter, the effectiveness of these provisions for the restriction of
command control is questionable. In most cases the influence of the
commanding officer would be too subtle to fall within the express prohibition of the Code. Even where there is a flagrant violation, it is too
much to expect that one of his subordinates will prefer charges against
him. The only efficient way in which the commander's influence can
be eliminated is by taking away his powers of appointment and review
and placing them in an independent body, thereby removing most of the
4 Uniform Code of Military Justice, arts. 22, 23, 24, 64 Stat. L. 108 (1950), 50
U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §§551-736, hereinafter cited as U.C.M.J.
8 Id., art. 74.
11 Id., art. 26.
9 Id., art. 37.
6 Id., art. 27.
10 Id., art. 98.
1 Id., art. 63.
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opportunities for interference.11 Doubtless the elimination of command
control would destroy one of the greatest potential sources of prejudice
to a fair military trial. However, the extent to which such action would
impair the commanding officer's power of discipline is not clear. Thus
far, Congress has accepted the view of most military men that command
control is necessary to the· proper functioning of a military organization
and has preserved it relatively untouched in the new Code.

II. Insuflicient Number of Legally Trained Personnel
The Uniform Code of Military Justice has taken some significant
steps toward insuring a more competent tribunal. The Articles of War
provided that the trial judge advocate (prosecutor) and the defense
counsel in a general court-martial should be members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps or officers who were members of the bar of a
federal court or of the highest court of a state, "if available."12 The only
absolute requirement was that, if the trial judge advocate was a lawyer,
the defense counsel should have the same qualifications.13 The Code
has dropped the "if available" clause, making it an absolute requirement
that trained legal personnel, certified as competent by their respective
Judge Advocate Generals,1 4 be appointed as trial c9unsel (prosecutor)
and defense counsel.15 In addition to qualified counsel, the Code pro,vides that a law officer who is also either a member of the Judge Advocate General's Corps or a member of the bar of a federal court or of the
highest court of a state shall be appointed to every general court-martial.16 This law officer replaces the law member formerly required by
the Articles of War to be a voting member of the court. Under the
new Code the law officer is not a member of the court and does not
vote on any of the findings of the court.17 He rules on all interlocutory
questions except challenges, and his ruling is final except on motions to
dismiss and the question of sanity.18 He must charge the court with
11 This solution has been advanced by several writers. Keefe, "Codified Military In•
justice," 35 CoRN. L.Q. 151 at 158 (1950); Snedeker, "The Uniform Code of Military
Justice,'' 38 G:!lo. L.J. 521 at 525, 526 (1950).
12 Article of War 11, 62 Stat. L. 629 (1948), 10 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1950) §1482.
1s Ibid.
14 While this is intended to be some recognition of the fact that not all lawyers have
had sufficient experience with the military law to be competent to practice it, certification
is apt to be somewhat perfunctory if the applicant is a member of the bar of either a
federal court or the highest court of a state.
15 U.C.M.J., art. 27(b).
16 Id., art. 26(a).
11 Id., art. 26(b).
1s Id., art. 51(b).
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the elements of the offense, the presumption of innocence, and the
burden of proof.19 All proceedings except voting by the court must
he carried on in his presence, and all advice and instructions which
he gives must he made a part of the record.20 By separating the law
officer from the court the similarity between the law officer and a
civilian judge has been greatly increased. It is hoped that his position
as impartial arbiter of the law will instill a respect for his pronouncements similar to that accorded a civilian judge.
In the case of the special courts-martial, there has been no substantial change. No legal personnel need be present, except for the
provision that if the trial counsel is a lawyer the defense counsel must
he one also. 21 There is no law officer on a special court-martial, but the
president of the court is charged with similar duties. 22 In view of th~
inferior jurisdiction of the special courts-martial with respect to the
crimes which it may try and the punishments which it is authorized
to impose,23 it is felt that the absence of trained personnel is not sufficiently serious to merit the maintenance of enough trained personnel
to staff these tribunals.
III. Appellate Review before the Code
Prior to the Code the difficulty in securing independent appellate
review of trial proceedings by an accused who contends that his constitutional or statutory rights have been violated, has been a major defect in
military law. Review of courts-martial proceedings is to a certain extent
automatic. 24 This feature gives potentially greater protection to the
19 Id.,
20 Id.,
21 Id.,
22 Id.,

art. 5l(c).
art. 39.
art. 27(c).
art. 5l(c).
23 Id., art. 19.
24 Military punishment may be divided into two classes, judicial and non-judicial.
Non-judicial punishment is solely a matter of disciplinary action by the unit commander.
Judicial punishment is administered by three types of courts: summary, special, and general
courts-martial. The offenses over which these courts have jurisdiction progress from the
less to the more serious in that order. The convening authority automatically reviews all
cases tried by courts-martial. He may approve or disapprove the sentence and findings or
any part thereof. If he disapproves, he may either dismiss the case or order a new trial,
but in no event may he order a new trial if the verdict was not guilty or increase the sentence unless the sentence prescribed was mandatory. After taking final action the convening authority forwards the records to the office of the Judge Advocate General (Washington, D.C.) for the second automatic review. There all general courts-martial cases other
than those which could also have been tried by a special court-martial are reviewed by a
board of review. This board consists of not less than three officers or civilians who are
members of the bar of either a federal court or the highest court of a state. The same
treatment is given to the record of a special court-martial case in which a bad conduct dis-
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rights of military personnel than that which is accorded to civilians by
the Constitution and laws of the United States. Nevertheless, there is
a strong feeling that a review entirely within the military departments is
not really an effective safeguard for those rights. Heretofore, if errors
in trial procedure were not corrected by military review machinery, there
was no direct appeal to a civilian court.25 The only remedy available to
the accused was habeas corpus.26 The relatively narrow scope of the
Great Writ makes it entirely inadequate as an ordinary remedy for
such errors, particularly since the only relief obtainable by habeas corpus
is release from confinement. There is no :final determination thereby of
the guilt, innocence, or sanity of the petitioner. The only way in which
he can secure the relief afforded by habeas corpus is by showing a jurisdictional defect in the military tribunal. While the grounds for habeas
corpus relief for civilians are relatively well settled, unfortunately the
same cannot be said for military personnel.27 It is clear, however, that
the rights of military personnel under the Constitution are far less
extensive than those of civilians.28 The new Code has provided a civilian court of review which should eliminate in large part the necessity
of resort to habeas corpus with its attendant uncertainties.

IV: A Civilian Court of Military Appeals
Without doubt, the greatest single change in the military law produced by the· Code is the creation of a civilian Court of Military Apcharge is adjudged. All other special and summary courts-martial records are reviewed by
a member of the Judge Advocate General's Corps or a Law Specialist of the Navy. The
third review by the Court of Military Appeals is automatic only in certain cases, see text
infra. U.C.M.J., arts. 60, 61, 65, 66, 67.
25 Neither certiorari nor writ of error is available. Civilian courts will not look behind
the judgment of a military court, and will examine only its jurisdiction on writ of habeas
corpus. This policy is long established and there are no significant indications of any
tendency to change it. Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 6 S.Ct. 570 (1886); Johnson v.
Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 15 S.Ct. 773 (1895); Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S.Ct. 1
(1942); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 66 S.Ct. 340 (1946); Hyatt v. Brown, 337 U.S.
103, 70 S.Ct. 495 (1950).
26 For a detailed treatment of the scope of the writ of habeas corpus as a means of
securing review of military trials see, Wurfel, "Military Habeas Corpus," 49 MxCB:. L.
Rav. 493, 699 (1951).
27 Successful military habeas corpus applications seem to be limited to these narrow
grounds: (1) The military court was not legally constituted. (2) It did not have jurisdiction over the person tried. (3) It did not have jurisdiction over the offense charged. (4)
The sentence was not within the maximum limits prescribed for the offense. Id. at 713.
28 Civilians frequently and successfully invoke habeas corpus when they have been
denied due process of law. Attempts by military prisoners to secure relief on due process
grounds have been uniformly rebuffed by the Supreme Court. The normal constitutional
concept of due process is not one of the rights of military personnel. Id. at 713-722.
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peals. The court consists of three judges appointed from civilian life
by the President for a term of fifteen years. The judges are eligible for
reappointment and may be removed during their term only for neglect
of duty, malfeasance in office, or for mental or physical disability.29
Thus they are accorded the security of tenure generally considered necessary for the creation of a fearless judiciary.
In addition to its judicial duties, the court is required to meet annually with the Judge Advocate Generals to make a comprehensive
survey of the operation of the Code and to report to the Committee on
Armed Services in the Senate and the House of Representatives.30 It
is expected that these conferences will operate in a manner similar to
the Supreme Court Advisory Committee in making recommendations
to Congress for necessary changes in the Code.
Review by the Court of Military Appeals is not automatic except
in cases in which the sentence affects a general or Bag officer, or extends
to death, or in which the Judge Advocate General has ordered the case
forwarded to the court for review. In all other cases reviewed by a
board of review, 31 however, the court may, upon a petition of the
accused showing good cause, grant review. 32 In all cases reviewed by
the court, it may reverse for errors of law materially prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused.33 One of the first indications of how
effectively we may expect that power to be exercised is the recent decision of the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Clay. 34

V. United States v. Clay
This case is one of the early decisions handed down by the new
Court of Military Appeals. The accused was tried by a special courtmartial on two charges, one for an alleged disorder and the other for
improperly wearing the uniform. He pleaded guilty to the charge of
improperly wearing the uniform and not guilty to the charge of disorder.
The trial procedure was governed by the new Code.36 The president
29 U.C.M.J., art. 67(a)(3).
so Id., art. 67(g).
31 See note 24 supra.
s2 U.C.M.J., art. 67(b)(3).
33 Id., arts. 59(a), 67(d). Appeals to the Court of Military Appeals are limited to
questions of law. Since the convening authority and the board of review have the power
to review both facts and law, and since military men are more apt to be familiar with the
fact situations involved, it was felt that to give the court the power to review facts would
place an unnecessary burden upon it.
34 U.S.C.M.A. - , No. 49, Nov. 27, 1951.
35 The offenses were committed prior to the effective date of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (May 31, 1951), but since the hearing was not held until after that date,

1090

M1cmGAN LAw REvmw

[Vol. 50

neglected to charge the court on the elements of the offense, the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof, as provided by the
Code36 and the Manual for Courts-Martial.37 The court found the
accused guilty on both charges. The convening authority concluded
that the error was not prejudicial and the board of review affirmed on
the ground that the evidence was of such quality and quantity that the
burden of proof was overcome, establishing beyond a reasonable doubt
the guilt of the accused.38 On certification of the question by the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy,39 the United States Court of Military
Appeals reversed. The power of the court to reverse is limited to errors
of law which materially prejudice the substantial rights of the accused.
In the Clay case the court declares that the source of these rights is
Congress and not the Constitution. The court, therefore, need not
determine the constitutional basis of the rights or their jurisdictional
or non-jurisdictional character, questions which have plagued other
civilian courts taking jurisdiction on habeas c~rpus. The court instead
looks to the Code to find that Congress has declared that there are
certain fundamental or substantial rights inherent in the trial of military
offenses which must be accorded the accused before it can be said that
he has been fairly convicted. Since the court feels that it was the intent
of Congress to place military justice on the same plane as civilian
justice, it proposes to enforce those rights with the same vigor with
which the other federal courts enforce the rights of civilians under the
the trial procedure was governed by the new Code. Executive Order 10214, 16 Fed. Reg.
1303 (1951).
U.C.M.J., art. 51(c).
CotmTS-MARTIAL, United States, 1951, 1[73(b). The Manual far
Courts-Martial, sometimes hereinafter referred to briefly as the Manual, was published by
the President by Executive Order 10214, 16 Fed. Reg. 1303 (1951), pursuant to the Code
which provides, "The procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-martial •••
and other military tribunals may be prescribed by the President by regulations. • • ."
U.C.M.J., art. 36.
.
88 The test to be used in determining whether error is substantial or not is that it is
substantial "unless the competent evidence of record is of such quantity and quality that a
court of reasonable and conscientious men would have made the same finding had the error
not been committed.'' M.ANuAL FOR CotmTs-MARTIAL, United States, 1951, 1[87(c).
89 U.C.M.J., art. 67(b)(2), permits the Judge Advocate General of any of the Services to certify questions to the court for review. This appeal was not taken by the accused
under art. 67(b)(3) of the Code. Presumably the Judge Advocate General of the Navy
brought the appeal because he wished to obtain a clarification of the questions raised by the
Court of Military Appeals decision in United States v. Lucas, U.S.C.M.A. - , No.
7, Nov. 8, 1951. In that case the court had held that a failure to charge the court with
the elements of the offense, the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof where
a plea of guilty has been entered [as provided by the Manual, 1[73(c)] was an error of law,
but not such an error as would be materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused.
86

87 MANrrAL FOR
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Constitution and laws of the United States. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Clay case is the court's concept of the effect of the
standards set up by the Code and the court's own function in enforcing those standards. The standards vary in importance. The more
important of them form a pattern which the court chose to label "military due process." "Military due process" is a framework of the minimum rights afforded to military personnel. A failure to accord an
accused one of these rights would be grounds for reversal. It is the
court's function to determine the prejudicial effect of a denial of any
right under the Code. It does so by examining previously adjudicated
federal court cases. If the denial of a right to a civilian, comparable to
a right established by the Code, is of sufficient importance to justify a
civilian court in holding that there was a lack of due process, then a
denial of the comparable right to the accused in a military trial would
constitute a lack of "military due process." Having determined that a
failure to charge a jury with the elements of the offense was considered
in a civilian court to be a denial of due process,40 the court held that
the failure to do so by the president of the special court-martial was
reversible error. Prior to the Code, the protection afforded by the concept of due process of law was limited to civilians. The effect of this
decision, however, seems to be to transplant to the military law all
of the rights afforded by that concept which have a military counterpart in the new Code.41
In addition to the creation of the concept of a statutory "military
due process," the court has made other improvements in the protection
given to the right to a fair military trial. Consistent with its interpretation of Congress's intent to place military and civilian justice on the
same plane, the court has in subsequent decisions continued its policy
of applying civilian principles of procedure wherever possible. In
40 Citing Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 at 54, 55, 69 S.Ct. 1357 (1949); United States
v. Levy, (3d Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 995 at 998; Williams v. United States, (D.C. Cir.
1942) 131 F. (2d) 21 at 22; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 at 107, 65 S.Ct. 1031
(1945).
41 The court suggested the following as a few of the rights which make up the pattern
of militru:y due process: "To be informed of the charges against him; to cross-examine
witnesses for the government; to challenge members of the court for cause or peremptorily;
to have a specified number of members compose general and special courts-martial; to be
represented by counsel; not to be compelled to incriminate himself; to have involuntru:y
confessions excluded from consideration; to have the court instructed on the elements of
the offense, the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof; to be found guilty of
an offense only when a designated number of members concur in a finding to that effect;
to be sentenced only when a certain number of members vote in the affirmative; and to
have an appellate review." United States v. Clay, - U.S.C.M.A. - , No. 49, Nov. 27,
1951.
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United States v. Wjlliams42 it gave further protection to the right to
have the military court properly instructed by the law officer by holding
that if the instructions were substantially prejudicial, a failure of the
defense counsel to make a timely objection did not constitute a waiver
of that right.43 In other cases the court has held that while its power
to review is limited to questions of law, it may, like other appellate
courts, weigh evidence for the purpose of determining its sufficiency
as a matter of law. 44 The new Court of Military Appeals is proving to
be not only a court of last resort for the accused in a military trial,45 but
a tribunal in which he may expect the military law to be applied as
nearly as possible in accord with the principles of civilian criminal
procedure which are traditional in the Anglo-American legal system.
VI. Conclusions
Granting that the reluctance to diminish disciplinary control over
courts-martial has prevented the correction of some of the greatest infirmities in the military law, what has been accomplished is not to be
slighted. The right to a fair military trial has received effective new
machinery for its protection. Our law is founded more upon hindsight
than upon foresight. In both civilian and military law we have been
content to reform for the present and not the future. The best that can
be hoped is that we will not lag too far behind the times. It is perhaps
unfortunate that the impetus of World War I did not produce even
greater changes in the military law, but with the aid of the annual
report on the operation of the Code to keep the needs of the military
law before Congress, it is to be hoped that when further reform is
essential it will be forthcoming.
John F. Spindler
U.S.C.M.A. - , No. 133, Feb. 21, 1952.
court considered the relationship of rules 30 and 52 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the effect of Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031
(1945), to reach the conclusion that the failure of the defense counsel to object was not a
waiver, even though the Manual states in ~67(a) that "failure to assert any such defense
or objection • . • before the conclusion of the hearing . • . constitutes a waiver." See also
United States v. Rhoden, - U.S.C.M.A. - , No. 153, Feb. 26, 1952.
44E.g., United States v. Shull, - U.S.C.M.A. - , No. 45, Feb. 18, 1952.
45 If a petition for review of an accused were denied or his conviction affirmed by the
Court of Military Appeals, habeas corpus would still lie for any jurisdictional defects which
he might allege, but presumably he would have to exhaust his military remedy fust by
making such an application to the Court of Military Appeals.
42_

43 The

